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Abstract 
Exporting and FDI have traditionally been two major firm-level responses to globalization. 
Export outsourcing (EO), a new strategy that gained in importance recently, has now become 
another alternative. This paper seeks to examine how firms choose between EO and outward FDI by 
looking into firm-level productivity differences. A special data set is constructed by consolidating 
two micro data sets of Taiwanese manufacturing firms. The paper contributes in four main ways. 
First, it provides a causality analysis of labor productivity and EO, whereas previous studies deal 
only with correlations. Second, it shows that EO can be interpreted as an indirect way of exporting. 
Third, it points out that outward FDI itself may not help with productivity if it is not linked with EO, 
which finding contradicts conventional wisdom. Finally, most evidences seem to imply that the 
intricate Taiwan-China interconnection is a significant factor that facilitates or contributes to all 
above-mentioned findings. 
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1. Outsourcing, FDI and Exporting 
Exporting and foreign direct investment (FDI hereafter)
1 have traditionally been two 
major firm-level responses to globalization (Greenaway, 2004). During the current wave of 
globalization, a variety of new responses have emerged, given that fundamental changes 
have taken place in the nature of international trade and production. In addition to the 
deepening of vertical specialization in manufacturing (Hummels, et al., 2001) and the boom 
in moving services offshore (Dosanni, 2004), export outsourcing (EO hereafter) is an 
important new strategy of firms, when faced with changing comparative advantages (Liu, et 
al., 2005). In this new type of outsourcing, a firm that receives export orders may 
subcontract part of the order to low-wage countries, thus playing the dual role of a 
middleman and a manufacturer. The new strategy has now become another major response 
of a firm in serving foreign markets. 
To be more precise, a firm can choose to produce onshore or offshore in order to 
export. A traditional way of exporting is to keep the production at home. The firm can 
produce in-house, or source out, or engage in imported-input-based outsourcing (import 
outsourcing hereafter) via vertical specialization. An alternative way to serve foreign 
markets is to pursue export outsourcing and produce abroad. If the firm chooses to produce 
abroad, it can send the export orders to its own foreign subsidiary, or to independent 
contractors. While EO and FDI are both alternatives to the conventional type of exporting, 
these two strategies are not mutually exclusive choices and may co-exist. Moreover, EO 
and FDI both mean the substituting away of jobs at home, but may involve different degree 
of flexibility and setup cost. The intricate relationship between exports, outward FDI, and 
EO thus deserve a more careful study, especially for export-oriented countries. 
There has already been a large literature focusing theoretically on the choices between 
import outsourcing and FDI (e.g., Antràs and Helpman, 2004; Grossman and Helpman, 
                                                 
1    In this paper, we refer mainly to outward FDI of a firm in home country rather than the inward FDI by a 
foreign firm. 
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2003) or between FDI and exports (e.g., Helpman, et al., 2004). Due to data scarcity, only a 
handful of empirical studies look into the choices between FDI and exports (e.g., Head and 
Ries, 2004; Kim and Kang, 1997) or the productivity differences between firms that export, 
import outsource, or invest abroad (e.g., Girma, et al., 2004; Tomiura, 2004). These studies, 
however, have all neglected the fact that export outsourcing has gained rapidly in 
importance as a choice by an exporting firm. So the important questions of how firms 
choose between EO and outward FDI, and how the choice of strategy affects the labor 
productivity of the firm are left unanswered. 
In view of this, the paper conducts an empirical analysis of productivity differences 
among exporting firms, which are classified into four types, according to whether or not 
they engage in EO and in outward FDI. The study is based on the pioneer work of Liu, et al. 
(2005), who have explored the nature and determinants of export outsourcing as a new 
response of exporting firms to the current wave of globalization. To have a better 
understanding of the consequences of EO on productivity, a special data set is constructed 
by consolidating two micro data sets of Taiwanese manufacturing firms. In addition to a 
statistical analysis, we engage in a series of econometric investigations on firm-level 
productivity as determined by their export strategies (EO or FDI) and firm characteristics. 
The paper contributes in four main ways. First, it provides a causality analysis of labor 
productivity and export outsourcing, whereas previous studies deal only with correlations. 
Second, it shows that EO, which has not been adequately understood yet, is actually an 
indirect way of exporting, and is an effective way to cope with the changes in 
competitiveness. Third, it points out that outward FDI itself may not help with labor 
productivity if it is not linked with EO. This finding is probably against conventional 
wisdom and deserves further attention in the future. Finally, all the evidences seem to imply 
that the Taiwan-China interconnection is a significant factor that facilitates or contributes to 
all the above-mentioned findings. 
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2. Data and Statistics 
2.1 Data Source 
A special data set is constructed for this study, consolidating two micro data sets. The 
first set is the “Export Orders Survey, 2001” conducted by the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs with a survey. The survey contains information regarding the basic features of 
exporting firms in Taiwan, along with their FDI status and decisions on EO in 2001.
2 The 
other set is the “Industrial Statistical Survey, 2000”, in which more detailed firm 
characteristics are available, but at a one-year lag from the former set of data. Consolidating 
the two sets and excluding pure traders, we obtain 1,336 firm-level observations of 
exporting firms in the manufacturing industries.
3
2.2 Measuring Relative Labor Productivity 
A common measurement of labor productivity is sales per employee (e.g., Girma, et al., 
2004).
4 To ensure comparability across industries, we calculate the relative labor 
productivity, which is the labor productivity of a firm relative to that of the industry to 





RLP ≡                ( 1 )  
where  ( ) is the labor productivity of firm i, i LP ij ij employee sales / ≡
5 and 
                                                 
2    It is worth mentioning that almost 78% of all manufacturing firms were exporters in Taiwan in 2001. 
And the value of export orders received by these 1,336 firms amounted to about 60% of national total. 
Therefore, the data set is rather representative of Taiwan’s exporting firms in manufacturing. 
3    Firms with employees below 10 people are also excluded.   
4    Both value-added per employee and total factor productivity are used as indicators of labor productivity 
in other studies (Girma et al., 2004). We do not adopt these measures here, however, because detailed data on 
labor cost, intermediate input purchases, and other expenditures are unavailable in the “Export Orders Survey, 
2001”.  
5   As  each  firm  i is classified into one single industry j, the industry subscript j is dropped from RLPi and 
LPi ffor simplicity. 





ij j employee sale LP / ( ) is the weighted-average labor productivity of industry j. 
We categorize the 1,336 firms into four groups, based on if a firm invests overseas or 
if it outsources abroad. Table 1 shows that about half (680) of these firms engage in foreign 
direct investment (referred to as FDI firms hereafter) and one-third (451) engage in 
outsourcing activities (referred to as outsourcing firms). Among the 680 FDI firms, the 
percentage share of firms sourcing offshore is roughly the same as that either sourcing 
onshore or not outsourcing (referred to as domestic firms), 52.06% and 47.94%, 
respectively. But among those 656 domestic firms that do not engage in FDI, the percentage 
share of firms sourcing abroad (14.79%) is significantly smaller than that of the firms 
(85.21%) which source onshore (referred to as non-outsourcing firms). These facts suggest 
two things. First, FDI firms and domestic firms may have different needs for outsourcing. 
Second, outsourcing firms (O1) are more heterogeneous than non-outsourcing firms (O0), 
but FDI firms (F1) are more homogeneous than domestic firms (F0), judging from standard 
deviation of each category. 
The summary statistics of labor productivity of different groups of firms are shown in 
Table 1. While EO and FDI are both considered as the response of a firm when faced with 
changes in comparative advantages, we would expect that the outsourcing firms are more 
productive than non-outsourcing firms and FDI firms are also more productive than 
domestic firms. The results in Table 1 show that outsourcing firms do have a higher mean 
than the non-outsourcing firms with respect to labor productivity, which can be reasonably 
expected from past literature on import outsourcing (Antràs and Helpman, 2004). But 
contrary to conventional wisdom, which considers FDI firms to be more productive (Girma, 
et al., 2004; Antràs and Helpman, 2004), the labor productivity of domestic firms is found 
to be slightly higher than FDI firms. 
To see if this unexpected result is due to over aggregation of the data, we further 
dividing firms according to both FDI status and outsourcing decision, into four categories, 
i.e., F0O0, F0O1, F1O0, and F1O1. It is clear that even at the disaggregate level, domestic 
firms appear to have higher labor-productivity than FDI firms (Table 1). Note that the 
standard deviation of F0O1 is the highest among the four groups and F1O0 is the lowest, 
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suggesting that the largest heterogeneity is among the domestic-outsourcing group while 
the FDI-but-non-outsourcing group is the least heterogeneous. 
2.3 Comparing Labor Productivity Across Groups 
Going beyond the analysis on means and standard deviations, we compare the entire 
distribution of labor productivity across the four groups of firms following Girma (2004). 
Figure 1 shows the cumulative distribution of the relative labor productivity of the four 
types of firms. The domestic firms engaging in outsourcing (F0O1) lie at the farthest right, 
indicating that this group is the most labor productive group, whereas the FDI firms without 
outsourcing (F1O0) is the least labor productive group. The other two groups lie in-between 
with the FDI-outsourcing group (F1O1) to the right of the domestic-non-outsourcing group 
(F0O0). These results are consistent with what are shown in Table 1. 
The cumulative distribution function diagram shows the relative distributions of labor 
productivity for different groups, but it does not tell us whether the distribution of one 
group significantly differs from another. To test for the differences in all moments of the 
distributions, we perform the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test and report the test statistics of 
the two-sided and one-sided KS tests in Table 2. Each time, the cumulative distribution 
functions of two groups are compared.
6 In the pair of non-outsourcing firms (O0 ) vs. 
outsourcing firms (O1), there exist statistically significant productivity differences at the 
aggregate level. At the disaggregate level, the differences are also statistically significant, 
regardless of the FDI status. This is in line with the findings of Table 1 and Figure 1. In 
                                                 
6    The null and alternative hypothesis for the two-sided KS test are  and 
, respectively.    The two-sided KS test statistics is 
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. Similarly, the null and alternative hypothesis for the one-sided KS test are 
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contrast, the null hypothesis of identical distributions of labor productivity between FDI 
firms and domestic firms cannot be rejected at either the aggregate or disaggregate levels. 
These results echo the findings from Table 1, but are against conventional wisdom. 
3. The Empirical Model 
Results of the statistical tests above can be summarized in two major points. Export 
outsourcing firms are more productive than non-outsourcing firms, while FDI firms may be 
less (or similarly) productive than domestic firms. These results, however, require further 
examination because of the self-selection problem. A firm may self-select itself into a 
certain group and shares similar firm- or industry-characteristics as other firms in the same 
group. In such cases, the results from the statistical analysis may only reflect the 
characteristics effect across groups rather than the pure group effect related with the 
decisions to FDI and to EO. We therefore engage in a series of labor productivity 
regressions, which control for firm-level and industry-level characteristics to sort out the 
group effect on labor productivity from the characteristics effect. 
A couple of related questions to ask are whether or not a firm with higher productivity 
tends to self-select itself into an outsourcing group, and whether or not outsourcing helps a 
firm to increase its labor productivity. To illustrate the causality, we add an outsourcing 
equation to the model and treat the equations of labor productivity and outsourcing decision 
as jointly determined. The models are introduced below. 
3.1 Labor Productivity Equation 
Assume that a firm’s relative labor productivity depends not only on whether it 
sources offshore and invests abroad but also on the structure of FDI (FRE) and on the 
characteristics of firm i (Xi) and its industry j (Xj). The relative labor productivity equation 
is formulated as follows:   
i j i i i i i X X FRE F O RLP ε α α α α α α + + + + + + = 5 4 3 2 1 0 .       (2) 
where RLPi is the relative labor productivity of firm i as defined in equation (1).   
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The variables Oi and Fi are respectively the outsourcing and FDI dummies, where a 
value of 1 indicates that firm i is an outsourcing (or FDI) firm, and 0 otherwise. Although 
there is no previous study on the relations between EO activity and parent firm’s 
productivity,
7 it is reasonable to anticipate a positive association between the dummy Oi and 
RLPi, as export outsourcing can be seen as an indirect way of exporting, and the EO firm 
can contract out the less-productive portion of the orders, or share the x-efficiency 
involved.
8 As for FDI, past studies have also shown that FDI firms have higher labor 
productivity than domestic firms, but our statistical result as discussed in the previous 
section implies the opposite. We therefore rely on the regression to affirm their relationship. 
In addition to the FDI dummy, the structures of FDI (the type, location, and age) may 
also affect the firm-level labor productivity. We begin by considering the type of FDI. A 
firm that engages in vertical FDI is able to move the more labor-intensive production 
process overseas, whereas a firm that engages in horizontal FDI can move the 
manufacturing of low-end products (usually the more labor-intensive products) abroad. The 
labor productivity at home may rise in both cases. Whether the difference between the two 
types of FDI can be identified is therefore not too clear. Second, the destination of FDI 
matters. To invest in an advanced country may bring about technological externality and 
thus increase the labor productivity at home, while to invest in a low-wage developing 
country may not have such externalities. Third, the age of a foreign subsidiary can make a 
difference. The questions of whether or not FDI has an effect on labor productivity of the 
parent firm, and whether the effect is short-term or permanent need to be explored. These 
interesting issues are nevertheless little noticed in the literature. We shall formulate 
empirically tests in this paper. 
Firm characteristics of firm i (Xi) may include variables as firm size, R&D intensity, 
                                                 
7    Firms that engage in import outsourcing are found to be more productive than those that do not (e.g., 
Antràs and Helpman, 2004; Girma and Görg, 2004) 
8    Ten Raa and Wolff (2001) have showed that the growth of labor productivity in manufacturing 
industries is positively related to an increased use of service outsourcing. Fixler and Siegel (1999), on the 
other hand, argue that the effect of outsourcing on the productivity of service sectors is negative in the short 
run but positive in the long run. 
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technology purchase, export-to-sales ratio and growth rate of export order. The empirical 
evidence on the relations between firm size and productivity has not been very clear. It will 
be left for our regression to answer. As for the other firm characteristics, high ratio of R&D 
or technology purchase, high intensity in export and high export growth rate presumably 
have a positive correlation with high productivity (Aw and Hwang, 1995; Hwang, 2003). 
Some of the industry characteristics may not show up in the present setup, because the 
firm-level labor productivity is already calibrated by industry-level productivity. However, 
other industry characteristics, such as the export growth performance, may have an effect.
9 
Liu, et al. (2005) have found that firms in both export-thriving and export-declining 
industries are more likely to resort to EO than if they are in the export-sluggish industries. 
We can stretch this finding and arrive at the implication that firms in these two groups have 
higher productivity because of the freedom to choose production sites. Whether this 
implication is tenable or not will be examined empirically. 
3.2 The Outsourcing Decision 
Unlike the outsourcing decision, which can vary year over year, the FDI decision is 
more of a permanent type. Whether or not a firm has a foreign subsidiary (Fi) at the 
beginning of time t is already determined and can be taken as given, but whether or not to 
outsource (Oi) is a choice variable that is yet to be determined. And the decision of a firm to 
EO is simultaneously made with the level of labor productivity. 
Assume that firm i’s decision on whether or not to outsource abroad depends on the 
value of  , which is a function of a set of independent variables  : 
*
i O i w
i i i u w O + = '
* β                                                ( 3 )  





                                                 
9    Following Liu, et al. (2005), all industries are divided into three groups by their average annual growth 
rate of exports in 1990~2000. The export-thriving industries include those industries with a growth rate 
greater than or equal to the world average of 7% for all industries. Those with a rate between 0% and 7% are 
the export-sluggish industries, and those with a rate below 0% are the export-declining. The Thriving and 
Declining dummies are in the regression, as export-sluggish industries are taken as the base of comparison. 
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decision on outsourcing from its sign. When  , firm i decides to source offshore (O 0
* > i O i 
=1); otherwise it sources onshore (Oi =0): 
, 1 = i O  if  ,  0
* > i O
, 0 = i O  if  .                                              ( 4 )   0
* ≤ i O
Suppose that the error terms of equations (1) and (2) (i.e., u andε ) have a bivariate 
normal distribution with zero means and correlation  ρ :] , , 1 , 0 , 0 [ ρ σε . Then   
i i i i i v w u RLP E O RLP
i + − > = > ] ' [ 0
* β  
i u i i v z + + = ) ( ' β λ β α λ           ( 5 )  
where   ( i z ' α ) denote the matrix (the coefficient) of the right-hand side variables in 
equation (2) and  ε λ ρσ β = . )) ' ( / ) ' ( )( ( i i u i w w β β φ β λ Φ ≡   is the inverse of the Mills’ ratio 
(Heckman, 1979). Equation (5) implies that the least-squares estimates  α  from  regression 
(2) will be inconsistent if the correlation between u and  ε  (i.e.,ρ ) is significantly 
different from zero (Greene, 2000). 
The variable    is a function of a set of independent variables  , such as lagged 
labor productivity (RLP
*
i O i w
i, t-1), FDI (Fi), FDI related variables (FREi), the characteristics of 
firm i (Xi) and industry j (Xj). The variables are defined in the same way as in the labor 
productivity equation. 
4. The Empirical Results 
The empirical results are reported in Table 4, where column (1) is the OLS estimates 
from equation (2), and columns (2) and (3) are the maximum likelihood estimates from 
equations (3) to (5). The likelihood ratio tests for regression (2) or (3) suggest that the 
equations of labor productivity and outsourcing are negatively correlated at 1% significance 
level. The maximum likelihood estimates serve to correct for the downward bias of the 
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estimate for OUTSOURCE derived from the OLS regression. The implications are 
therefore drawn mainly from the maximum likelihood estimates. 
4.1 Labor Productivity 
Table 4 shows that the coefficients of most firm-level characteristics are statistically 
significant. Small firms are found to correlate with higher labor productivity than 
medium-size firms, and medium-sized firms are higher than large firms. As for the 
technology related terms, the coefficient of TEC is positive but insignificant, while that of 
RD is negative. The negative relation between R&D and productivity is unexpected, but the 
cross term (RDLARGE) is large and the coefficient is larger than that of RD. That is to say, 
if a firm is large in size, a higher spending on R&D can help to improve labor productivity. 
The coefficient of export ratio (EXRATIO) has a negative sign, which is contradictory to the 
conventional wisdom that a firm who is more export-intensive tends to perform better and 
have higher productivity (Girma, et al., 2004; Greenaway and Kneller, 2004). However, 
when combing with the positive effect of the squared term of export ratio (EXRATIO2), the 
result indicates that if a firm derives a large enough portion of total revenue from exporting 
(≥70%), its labor productivity is likely to be higher than a firm that exports proportionally 
less.
10 Finally, the growth rate of the export order over the previous year has a positive sign, 
showing that the better growth perspective the firm has, the higher its labor productivity is. 
The two industry characteristics, after controlling for firm characteristics, turn out to 
be insignificant in affecting a firm’s labor productivity. This may be due to the fact that 
labor productivity is already defined as a relative term net of certain industry characteristics. 
The estimated industry effect is therefore negligible. 
The coefficient of the FDI dummy is negative and counter-intuitive but that of the FDI 
to the U.S. is positive in sign and a high value. These results imply that firms that have 
                                                 
10  Note that the EXRATIO and EXRATIO2 variables include only the exports from the parent firm in the 
home country. If these two variables are replaced by the ratio of total export inclusive of offshore exports to 
sales, the signs remain the same, but the critical value for the export ratio to exert positive impact on 
productivity decreases to about 38%. In other words, if “indirect” exports are also accounted for, export 
activity is more closely correlated with productivity improvements.   
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been able to invest in industrial countries are the most productive firms, while those that go 
elsewhere (mainly to China) are less productive. The variables related to the vertical FDI 
(DOWN and UP) are both negative, with the former significantly different from zero. This 
is to say that horizontal FDI is more helpful to improve the efficiency of parent firm than 
vertical FDI. The age of foreign subsidiary has a negative sign, but the square term is 
positive, implying that the age has a depressing effect on productivity in the short run, but 
an enhancing effect in the long run. These results indicate that in the first 15 years or so of 
an investment abroad, the labor productivity of the parent firm is adversely associated, but 
the negative correlation turns into a positive relation later on. These results may be 
connected with the negative sign of FDI, which will be examined again in Section 4.3. 
Finally, the outsource dummy has a positive sign and is very significant, indicating a 
strong and positive relationship between a firm’s productivity and its engagement in EO 
activity. Although the sign fits with our expectation, we cannot jump to the conclusion that 
the high productivity is the result of an EO activity. A more detailed study is necessary. 
4.2 Export Outsourcing 
In the outsourcing equation, Table 4 (columns (2) and (3)) shows that firms are more 
likely to practice EO if they are small, in export-thriving or export-declining industries, 
invest abroad (in particular to China), engage in vertical-specialization type of FDI, and are 
experienced (but not too experienced) in FDI. These results conform to the findings in Liu, 
et. al. (2005). 
The most important message in columns (2) and (3) is the existence of a virtuous 
circle in engaging in EO. Highly productive firms in the previous year are more likely to 
choose to outsource their export orders this year; and if they do engage in EO, the labor 
productivity will further be improved. The causal relationship is clear and logical. 
In addition to the analysis on the level of labor productivity, a regression on the 
first-difference of productivity is presented in Table 5. Two extra variables are added on the 
right-hand side. Although the first difference of employment is significantly positive in 
column (4), the absence of the variable does not affect the other result much, so we shall 
focus on column (5). Based on the concept of conditional beta-convergence, the first 
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difference, RLPdiff, should be negatively related to the starting level of relative productivity, 
to which RLP-1 serves as a proxy. Indeed these two variables are negative associated. The 
coefficients of most other variables are qualitative the same as in the regressions on levels 
as summarized in Table 4. In particular, the coefficient of FDI remains negative in sign at 
1% significance level, confirming the finding in Table 4 that FDI tends to lower the 
productivity of the parent firm at home. In sum, the findings of the first difference of 
productivity confirm the robustness of the regression results on the level regressions. 
4.3 Explaining FDI 
A key question left to be answered is why the FDI dummy and some FDI-related 
variables exhibit unexpected signs. We run a set of maximum-likelihood regressions to 
decompose the changes in labor productivity to relative sales and relative employment. The 
results are reported in Table 6.
11
A striking result is that although the coefficient of FDI is still significantly negative in 
the relative sales equation, it is positive (yet insignificant) in the relative employment 
equation; and the signs of the coefficients for outsourcing is significantly positive in the 
relative sales equation, but significantly negative in the relative employment equation. 
These findings indicate that setting up a foreign subsidiary may not take away domestic 
jobs for the moment, but sales are unfavorably affected. Export outsourcing, by contrast, 
involves immediate job loss at home, but is ironically positively related with relative sales. 
As the relative sales effect dominate the employment effect for both FDI and 
OUTSOURCE dummies, the combined effects shown in columns (2) and (3) in Table 4 are 
negative for FDI and positive for OUTSOURCE. 
5. Summary and Concluding Remarks 
Four interesting points stand out from the above discussion. First, the paper provides a 
                                                 
11    In the case relative employment, as the result of the likelihood-ratio test of the employment equation 
and the outsourcing equation indicates no correlation between the two equations, we report only the OLS 
results. 
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causality analysis of labor productivity and export outsourcing, whereas previous studies in 
similar areas deals only with correlations. Further, these results are robust, as confirmed by 
both the level regressions and first-difference regressions. 
Second, the results indicate the important contribution of EO to labor productivity. 
This implies that EO is an effective way to cope with changes in competitiveness, as it is 
actually an indirect way of exporting, which would supplement the direct (or conventional) 
exporting that is faced with intensified competition under the new wave of globalization. 
Third, our study points out that outward FDI itself would not help with the 
improvement of labor productivity, if the investment is not linked with EO activities. This 
finding makes an interesting contrast with previous studies on import outsourcing and FDI, 
which are considered as substitutes in many studies (e.g., Helpman, et al., 2004).   
A related and final point is that, the Taiwan-China interconnection appears to be an 
important factor that facilitates or contributes to all the above-mentioned findings. A 
rationale may be that China helps to lengthen the life of uncompetitive firms in Taiwan, 
through either FDI or EO activities. As the China connection seems to be unique to Taiwan 
(and Hong Kong), the implication to other economies is yet to be found out. 
In sum, the first two of the four major points are well-supported in the paper, but the 
last two points obviously demand further study, as they are quite unique, and we need to 
sort out between commonality and exception in drawing lessons from such studies. 
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Table 1    Basic Statistics of Relative Labor Productivity 
  No. of 
Observations  Mean
  Standard 
Deviation
a
Outsourcing firms vs. Non-outsourcing firms: 
O1 451  1.265  1.715 
O0 885  0.903  1.147 
FDI firms vs. Domestic firms: 
F1 680  1.014  1.327 
F0   656  1.037  1.424 
Disaggregate Data: 
F1O1 354  1.213  1.694 
F1O0 326  0.798  0.687 
F0O1 97  1.456  1.786 
F0O0 559  0.964  1.340 
Total  1336  1.025  1.375 
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Table 2    Kolmogorov-Smirnov Tests for Different Types of Firms 
  A = B  A ≤ B  A ≥ B 
Outsourcing firms vs. Non-outsourcing firms: 
O0  vs.  O1 0.117 (0.001)*** 0.117 (0.000)*** -0.002  (0.997) 
F0O0   vs.  F0O1 0.140 (0.078)**  0.140 (0.039)**  -0.004  (0.998) 
F0O0   vs.  F1O1 0.111 (0.009)*** 0.113 (0.005)*** -0.004  (0.994) 
F1O0   vs.  F0O1 0.170 (0.027)*** 0.170 (0.010)*** -0.012  (0.980) 
F1O0  vs.  F1O1 0.156 (0.001)*** 0.156 (0.000)*** -0.014  (0.938) 
FDI firms vs. Domestic firms: 
F0  v s.  F1 0.041 (0.623)  0.037 (0.405)  -0.019  (0.792) 
F0O0  vs.  F1O0 0.071 (0.251)  0.035 (0.600)  -0.071  (0.126)*
F0O1   vs.  F1O1 0.103 (0.399)  0.057 (0.611)  -0.103  (0.201) 
 
  Note: ***, **, and * indicate significance at the one-tailed levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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Table  3  Variable  Definitions 
Variable  Definition  Mean Standard 
deviation  Min.  Max.
Labor productivity, sales and number of employees         
RLP 
= a firm’s labor productivity relative to 
the industry’s average labor 
productivity to which the firm 
belongs 
1.024 1.375  0.007 17.623
RLP-1 = RLP lagged one year  0.968 0.990  0.023 15.162
Relative sales 
= a firm’s sales relative to the 
industry’s average sales per firm to 
which the firm belongs 
0.986 3.334  0.003 78.35
Relative number of employees 
= a firm’s number of employees 
relative to the industry’s average 
number of employees per firm to 
which the firm belongs 
1.00 2.112  0.021 34.19
  RLPdiff = first difference of RLP (= RLP – 
RLP-1) 
     
Export outsourcing           
OUTSOURCE  = 1, if export orders are sent abroad 
= 0, otherwise 
0.338 0.473  0  1 
Firm scale           
LARGE  = 1, if the number of employees in the 
home country is greater or equal 
to 200 
= 0, otherwise 
0.457 0.498  0  1 
(medium firms)  = 1, if the number of employees in the 
home country is below 200 and 
greater or equal to 100 
= 0, otherwise 
0.263 0.440  0  1 
SMALL  = 1, if the number of employees in the 
home country is below 100 
= 0, otherwise 
0.280 0.449  0  1 
  Ldiff = first difference of employment (in 
1000) 
     
R&D and technology purchase          
RD  = R&D expenditure / Sales  0.017 0.033  0  0.482
RDLARGE  = RD x LARGE  0.009 0.020  0  0.243
TEC  = Technology purchase / Sales  0.002 0.013  0  0.227
Export ratio (exclusive of offshore exports)         
EXRATIO  = Exports from home country/ Sales  0.559 0.331  0  1 
EXRATIO2  = EXRATIO x EXRATIO  0.422 0.366  0  1 
Growth Rate of the Value of Export Orders         
  ORDER  = growth rate of the value of export 
orders in 2000~2001 
-0.06 0.414  -2.52 6 
  19 
Industry groups by average annual export growth rate in 1990~2000 
THRIVING  = 1, if in industries whose 10-year 
average export growth rate is greater 
or equal to the world average of 7%, 
which includes electronics, 
information and communications, 
chemicals, basic metals, precision 
instruments, electrical equipment, 
and plastics and rubber 
= 0, otherwise 
0.591 0.492  0  1 
(export-sluggish industries)  = 1, if in industries whose 10-year 
average export growth rate is 
non-negative but less than world 
average of 7%, which includes 
machinery, transportation equipment, 
textiles, furniture, and miscellaneous 
manufacturing 
= 0, otherwise 
0.306 0.461  0  1 
DECLINING  = 1, if in industries whose 10-year 
average export growth rate is 
negative, which includes footwear, 
plywood, household appliances, 
processed food, toys, games and 
sports, animal and plant products, 
leather, and ceramic products 
= 0, otherwise 
0.103 0.303  0  1 
Foreign direct investment           
FDI  = 1, if has foreign subsidiaries 
= 0, otherwise 
0.509 0.500  0  1 
CHINA  = 1, if foreign subsidiaries locate in 
China 
= 0, otherwise 
0.385 0.487  0  1 
USA  = 1, if foreign subsidiaries locate in 
Southeast Asia 
= 0, otherwise 
0.057 0.232  0  1 
UP  = 1, if foreign subsidiaries produce the 
upstream products for the parent 
firm;  
= 0, otherwise 
0.013 0.115  0  1 
DOWN  = 1, if foreign subsidiaries produce the 
downstream products for the parent 
firm;  
= 0, otherwise 
0.041 0.199 
 
0  1 
AGE  = the number of years the foreign 
subsidiaries have operated 
2.380 3.885  0  37 
AGE2  = AGE × AGE  20.75 71.70  0  1369
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The Labor Productivity Equation         
SMALL  0.42 (0.10)***  0.34 (0.11) ***  0.36  (0.10)*** 
LARGE  -0.24 (0.10)***  -0.16 (0.10)*  -0.18  (0.10)** 
RD  -2.23 (1.32)**  -1.77 (1.26)*  -1.97  (1.25)* 
RDLARGE  3.79 (2.38)*  3.48 (2.27)*  3.47  (2.27)* 
TEC  3.09 (2.90)  3.27 (2.75)  3.20  (2.74) 
EXRATIO  -3.60 (0.47)***  -3.44 (0.45)***  -3.52  (0.45)*** 
EXRATIO2
  2.56 (0.42)***  2.47 (0.41)***  2.53  (0.41)*** 
ORDER  0.30 (0.09)***  0.30 (0.09)***  0.29  (0.09)*** 
THRIVING  0.17 (0.08)**  -0.01 (0.09)    
DECLINING  0.20 (0.13)*  0.11 (0.14)    
FDI  -0.11 (0.17)  -0.38 (0.18)**    
CHINA   -0.05 (0.15)  -0.15 (0.16)  -0.42  (0.11)*** 
USA  0.30 (0.21)*  0.50 (0.23)***  0.23  (0.19) 
UP  -0.11 (0.31)  -0.25 (0.34)  -0.29  (0.34) 
DOWN  -0.21 (0.19)  -0.41 (0.20)**  -0.46  (0.20)*** 
AGE/10  0.07 (0.22)  -0.55 (0.20)***  -0.72  (0.23)*** 
AGE2/100  -0.04 (0.10)  0.18 (0.11)**  0.22  (0.11)** 
OUTSOURCE  0.22 (0.09)***  1.65 (0.13)***  1.62  (0.13)*** 
CONSTANT  1.83 (0.15)***  1.68 (0.15)***  1.67  (0.14)*** 
The Outsourcing Equation     
RLP-1    0.31 (0.04)***  0.30  (0.04)*** 
SMALL     0.08 (0.10)  0.07  (0.10) 
LARGE     -0.19 (0.09)**  -0.19  (0.09)** 
THRIVING     0.42 (0.09)***  0.41  (0.08)*** 
DECLINING     0.32 (0.14)***  0.37  (0.13)*** 
FDI     0.53 (0.17)***  0.37  (0.15)*** 
CHINA     0.28 (0.15)**  0.40  (0.14)*** 
USA     -0.37 (0.20)**  -0.25  (0.19)* 
UP     0.18 (0.33)  0.20  (0.33) 
DOWN     0.35 (0.19)**  0.37  (0.18)** 
AGE/10     1.16 (0.22)***  1.23  (0.21)*** 
AGE2/100     -0.37 (0.10)***  -0.04  (0.10)*** 
CONSTANT     -1.52 (0.11)***  -1.51  (0.11)*** 
No. of Observations  1336  1336  1336 
R-squared  0.1172    
Log Likelihood    -2912.6679  -2915.4277 
ρ     -0.62  -0.61 
σ     1.42  1.42 
λ     -0.88  -0.87 
 








c: ***, **, and * indicate significance at the one-tailed levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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SMALL  0.18 (0.09)**  0.18  (0.09)** 
LARGE  -0.17 (0.08)**  -0.17  (0.08)** 
Ldiff 0.08 (0.05)*    
RLP-1 -0.44 (0.03)***  -0.44  (0.03)*** 
EXRATIO  -2.72 (0.42)***  -2.73  (0.42)*** 
EXRATIO2
  1.96 (0.38)***  1.98  (0.38)*** 
ORDER  0.24 (0.08)***  0.23  (0.08)*** 
THRIVING  0.07 (0.08)  0.07  (0.08) 
DECLINING  0.15 (0.12)  0.15  (0.12) 
FDI  -0.35 (0.16)***  -0.35  (0.16)*** 
CHINA   0.08 (0.14)  0.08  (0.14) 
USA  0.39 (0.19)**  0.39  (0.19)** 
UP  -0.33 (0.29)  -0.33  (0.29) 
DOWN  -0.32 (0.17)**  -0.32  (0.17)** 
AGE/10  -0.30 (0.22)*  -0.31  (0.22)* 
AGE2/100  0.11 (0.10)  0.11  (0.10) 
OUTSOURCE  0.97 (0.20)***  0.98  (0.20)*** 
CONSTANT  1.02 (0.14)***  1.03  (0.14)*** 
Number of Observations  1336  1336 
Log Likelihood  -2806.5624  -2807.5563 
ρ   -0.38  -0.38 
σ   1.21  1.22 
λ   -0.46  -0.46 
 
a:    The likelihood-ratio test of the independent equations of sales and outsourcing (ρ=0) is: χ
2(1)=4.30, 
Prob>χ
2=0.0381. The results indicate a correlation between the two equations at 5% significance level, we 
therefore run the maximum-likelihood estimation for both equations. Since the results from the outsourcing 
equation are qualitatively the same as those from Table 4, we do not report their results.   
b: ***, **, and * indicate significance at the one-tailed levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 6    Regression Results for Sales and Number of Employees 






SMALL  -0.34 (0.28)  -0.18  (0.15) 
LARGE  1.48 (0.27)***  1.37  (0.15)*** 
RD  -1.83 (2.97)  -1.13  (1.98) 
RDLARGE  5.22 (5.37)  2.68  (3.56) 
TEC  7.72 (6.39)  10.85  (4.34)*** 
EXRATIO  -1.08 (1.08)  0.62  (0.70) 
EXRATIO2
  0.41 (0.98)  -0.79  (0.63)* 
ORDER  0.33 (0.21)*  0.01  (0.13) 
THRIVING  -0.64 (0.23)***  -0.09  (0.12) 
DECLINING  -0.06 (0.37)  0.28  (0.20)* 
FDI  -1.07 (0.47)***  0.05  (0.25) 
CHINA   -0.11 (0.43)  -0.06  (0.23) 
USA  1.41 (0.58)***  0.08  (0.31) 
UP  -0.99 (0.89)  -0.16  (0.47) 
DOWN  -1.10 (0.52)**  -0.26  (0.28) 
AGE/10  -1.07 (0.62)**  0.82  (0.33)*** 
AGE2/100  0.35 (0.28)*  -0.26  (0.15)** 
OUTSOURCE  4.22 (0.25)***  -0.28  (0.13)** 
CONSTANT  0.53 (0.38)*  0.37  (0.22)** 
No. of Observations  1336  1336 
R-squared   0.1584 
Log Likelihood  -4097.3957  
ρ   -0.76   
σ   3.69   
λ   -2.81   
 
a:    The likelihood-ratio test of the independent equations of sales and outsourcing (ρ=0) is: χ
2(1)=114.30, 
Prob>χ
2=0.0000. The results indicate a significant correlation between the two equations, we therefore run the 
maximum-likelihood estimation for both equations. However, we do not report the results for the outsourcing 
equation to save space. 
b:    The likelihood-ratio test of the independent equations of employees and outsourcing (ρ=0) is: 
χ
2(1)=0.04, Prob>χ
2=0.8471. The results indicate no correlation between the two equations, we therefore 
report the OLS results here.   
c: ***, **, and * indicate significance at the one-tailed levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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